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This paper reviews the background, fundamental questions, current issues, 
and goals of biolinguistics and biosemiotics. The purpose of this paper is to 
give a brief history of these movements, to clarify common objectives and 
areas of overlap, to evaluate recent articulations of their respective future 
agendas, and to address some aspects of focus and disciplinary prejudice 
that may stand in the way of productive collaboration concerning the 
biology of language.  
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1. Origins of Biolinguistics and Biosemiotics 
 
While the scholarly agendas of biolinguistics and biosemiotics may seem very 
different in scope, they unequivocally share a common interest in human 
language as a species-specific cognitive tool. They also share a philosophical core 
that is anchored in the concepts of Peircean abduction and Uexküllian Umwelt (cf. 
Augustyn 2009) on the one hand, and an interest in the building blocks of life and 
its underlying principles that has connected language to research in cell biology 
(cf. Barbieri 2010) on the other hand. 
 Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt — the subjective species-specific world created 
by an organism — is central to the ethological approach to human language 
shared by biolinguists and biosemioticians; and both movements have interacted 
in different ways with molecular biology to explore the Bauplan of human 
language and/or the semiotic capacities of various species. Examining the ways 
in which these interests intersect and diverge in biolinguistics and biosemiotics is 
the main objective of this paper. 
 Like Peirce, Uexküll approached nature and culture through the analysis of 
signs and sign processes; and his concept of Funktionskreis has been reinterpreted 
as a general model of semiosis. The semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce and 
Uexküll’s Umweltlehre are regarded by many, but not by all practitioners, as the 
theoretical and philosophical core of biosemiotics. Peirce is equally important to 
the origins of Chomskyan biolinguistics, but most likely also not valued to the 
same degree by all of its current practitioners. 
 Contemporary reviewers referred to Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) as a 
Kantian biologist (Wirth 1928). Trained as a zoologist and physiologist, Uexküll 
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first focused on the sense perception of organisms, mostly of marine animals. 
Throughout his career, Uexküll applied what he observed in his studies of mus-
cular physiology to the semiotic capacities of the organism as a whole; and his 
Umweltlehre evolved into a general theory of life as semiosis. Uexküll is, there-
fore, generally regarded as the forerunner of ethology and comparative psycho-
logy; and Konrad Lorenz owed the foundational insights that informed his expe-
riments with graylag geese, jackdaws, and dogs to Uexküll (G. von Uexküll 1964: 
198). 
 Jakob von Uexküll’s radical constructivism is exemplified in his statement 
that “[no] matter how certain we are of the reality that surrounds us, it only exists 
in our capacities to perceive it. That is the threshold we have to cross before we 
can go any further” (J. von Uexküll 1902: 213 [my translation]). Thure von Uex-
küll outlined the main aspects of Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory as follows 
(T. von Uexküll 1982: 4–8): 
 
(A) [True] reality (Jakob von Uexküll calls it Natur) that lies beyond or behind 
the nature that physicists, chemists, or microbiologists conceive of in their 
scientific systems reveals itself through signs. These signs are therefore the 
only true reality, and the rules and laws to which the signs and sign-
processes are subject are the only real laws of nature. […] 
(B) The methodology of Umwelt-research, which aims to reconstruct this 
‘creating’ of [reality] […] means, therefore reconstructing the Umwelt of 
another living being. […] 
(C) The aim of Umwelt research is to create a theory of the composition of 
nature […] [by exploring] the sign-processes that govern the behavior of 
living subjects.  
 
Chomsky’s interest in Uexküll and ethology was a result of discussing alter-
natives to the dominant paradigms in linguistics and behavioral psychology with 
Eric Lenneberg and Morris Halle in the early 1950s. The biolinguistic program, 
therefore, derives its general approach to human language from ethology and 
comparative psychology; and Konrad Lorenz played an important role in its evo-
lution (Jenkins 2000: 10). Especially Eric Lenneberg’s (1964) Biological Foundations 
of Language “anticipated many themes of the coming decades” (Jenkins 2000: 3); 
and Chomsky concluded in a famous interview that “[linguistics] is really a theo-
retical biology” (Sklar 1968: 218). Uexküll would have been pleased with bio-
linguists for “making [linguistics] a biological science” as he once suggested to a 
linguist friend in a letter (Kull 2001: 3). This is the point of view from which 
Sebeok’s biosemiotics approaches human language. 
 Based on these common ideas on the biological foundations of language 
and thought, both Chomsky and Sebeok emerged from the dominant paradigms 
in linguistics in the middle of the 20th century to follow new theoretical paths in 
linguistics and semiotics. Both Chomsky and Sebeok’s fundamental ideas about 
human language were connected to the work of ethologists and comparative psy-
chologists like Uexküll, Lorenz, and Tinbergen (cf. Lenneberg 1964); and their 
general views on human language have been consistently similar. They both see 
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human language foremost as a cognitive tool (because the species was capable of 
communication before it emerged). Agreement on this issue is far from trivial and 
its pronouncement bound to raise eyebrows among many linguists. Sebeok called 
language a secondary modeling system that allows the species to create models of 
reality in addition to the species-specific perceptual system, the primary modeling 
system (cf. Anderson & Merrell 1991, Sebeok & Danesi 2000). He believed that 
language served primarily “the cognitive function of modeling, and, as the 
philosopher Popper as well as the linguist Chomsky have likewise insisted […], 
not al all for the message swapping function of communication. The latter was 
routinely carried on by nonverbal means, as in all animals, and as it continues to 
be in the context of most human interactions today” (Sebeok 1991: 334). 
 Chomsky likewise sees language as a tool of thought that is based on 
principles that are not specific to language. They consequently also share the 
view that language is an exaptation; and they both see organism–environment-
interaction (i.e. species-specific Umwelt) as a crucial component of the growth of 
language in the individual. This is a view that separates them from a strong 
evolutionary psychology of language (e.g., Pinker 1994, 2003). 
 While the semeiotic of C.S. Peirce clearly provided the foundational philo-
sophical background for the “vast life science” that Sebeok saw in his global semi-
otics (cf. Sebeok 2001b), the Peircean concepts of abduction and habit-taking also 
play an essential role in Chomsky’s generative grammar. He recently referred to 
the analysis of the deep structure of abstract operations of formal grammar as a 
“Peircean logic of abduction” (Chomsky 2006: 86). 
 To different degrees, practitioners of both biolinguistics and biosemiotics 
connected with molecular biologists during the 1970s. An MIT conference in 1974 
solidified the affinities between the work of French molecular biologist François 
Jacob and Chomsky’s theory of principles and parameters. While this connection 
resulted in a reciprocal exchange of ideas between theoretical linguistics and 
molecular biology, Sebeok and his followers established their connection with 
biochemistry more indirectly by interpreting such work as Marcel Florkin’s 
(1974) “intracellular semiotics” (Kull 1999: 387), the work of Sorin Sonea and 
Maurice Panisset (1983), and Lynn Margulis (1998) (cf. Sebeok 2001b). Sebeok’s 
interaction with Thure von Uexküll (Jacob von Uexküll’s son), the founder of 
psychosomatic medicine in Germany, established the field of endosemiotics (e.g., 
T. von Uexküll et al. 1993); and towards the end of the millennium, biosemiotics 
found two molecular biologists to carry the project forward along somewhat dif-
ferent trajectories; Marcello Barbieri’s code biology on the one hand (e.g., Barbieri 
2003), and Jesper Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics on the other hand (e.g., Hoffmeyer 
2008).  
 The connection between cell biology and biosemiotics came from two 
distinct origins, but they both grew out of the desire of molecular biologists to 
overcome the limitations of mainstream biology to address fundamental 
questions revolving around concepts like signal, information, or code. The 
molecular biologist Jesper Hoffmeyer had turned to philosophy and connected 
with Sebeok in the early 1980s at a time when, after exploring the semiotic 
capacities of other animals in his zoosemiotics (e.g., Sebeok 1972), Sebeok wanted 
to establish a semiotics that sees life as semiosis on all levels. The biosemiotics 
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that Sebeok later considered to be his “principal contribution to semiotics” 
(Sebeok 2001b: 180) was one that included all levels of nature and culture beyond 
the boundaries that Umberto Eco had drawn in his Theory of Semiotics (Eco 1976), 
and he expanded semiotics to a vast life science down to the level of the cell. Eco 
had already drawn semiotics away from a focus on communication and 
established the primacy of signification, but declared zoosemiotics “the lower limit 
of semiotics” when drawing the “political boundaries” of the field (Eco 1976: 9). 
While some practitioners of semiotics welcomed Sebeok’s global (bio)semiotics 
that extends across all levels of life, others see it as a perhaps premature exten-
sion of zoosemiotics to all life forms that does not account for the different types of 
semiosis that exist in the living world. 
 Jesper Hoffmeyer organized the first of the Gatherings in Biosemiotics in 
Copenhagen in 2001, unfortunately the year of Sebeok’s death. After the fourth 
Gatherings in Prague, the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies was founded 
in 2005, with Hoffmeyer as its inaugural president. The Prague meeting in 2004 
had brought together an energetic group of molecular biologists, theoretical bio-
logists, embryologists, physicists, linguists, information scientists, philosophers 
of science, and others who agreed that the most fundamental characteristic of life 
is sign action/semiosis; and the movement gained the necessary moment-um to 
create an organization and found its journal Biosemiotics in 2005. The editor of this 
journal is the embryologist Marcello Barbieri, a scientist who had articulated a 
line of research on the organic codes of life he had previously called semantic 
biology (Barbieri 2003). 
 What separates these two distinct connections between molecular biology 
and semiotics is often reduced to an argument over whether the sign and semiosis 
(Sebeok/Hoffmeyer) or codes and code-making (Barbieri) should be considered 
primary in biosemiotics. Perhaps, the nature of these two currents that connect 
biosemiotics with molecular biology can best be characterized by different 
intellectual/scientific styles, one seeking a biology with a philosophical integrity 
that places the life sciences firmly within semiotic theory (Sebeok/Hoffmeyer), 
the other rooted in the natural sciences while at the same time promoting careful 
collaboration across the disciplines (Barbieri). 
 Meanwhile, the International Network in Biolinguistics had crystalized out of 
the work Chomsky, Halle, and Lenneberg had begun in the late 1950s. This 
scholarly organization had many precursors in different places at different times 
(cf. Jenkins 2000); but in its most recent configuration held its first meeting at the 
University of Arizona in Tucson (February 2008), organized by Massimo Piattelli-
Palmarini. The online Journal Biolinguistics published its first volume in 2007. 
Both movements have recently articulated formative statements (Fitch 2009, Kull 
et al. 2009), which will be addressed in more detail after first establishing an 
important characteristic that undeniably connects biolinguists with biosemio-
ticians.  
 
 
2. Biolinguists and Biosemioticians Have Never Been Modern 
 
In his essay We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour lays out what he calls the 
Modern Constitution that separates “three regions of being” (Latour 1993: 39), 
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nature — politics — and discourse through the processes he calls purification and 
mediation. While the work of purification separates nature from society and keeps 
the natural sciences as the domain of explaining natural phenomena separate 
from the social sciences as the domain of explaining the social order of things; the 
work of mediation explains how “mixing biology and society” makes it possible 
that “[all] of nature and all of culture get churned up again every day” (p. 2). The 
work of purification is characterized by working within the strict disciplinary 
boundaries of the natural sciences, so that the facts of nature are, in fact, created 
in the laboratory. Practices of purification rely on “two different ontological zones: 
that of human beings on the one hand, and that of non-humans on the other” (p. 
10). It is a consequence of this Modern Constitution that non-humans have come 
to make much better informants in the lab. 
 The work of mediation is the work of hybrids. The paradox of the Modern 
Constitution is that the separation of nature and society (= purification) both 
makes mediation possible, but marginalizes it and renders it invisible at the same 
time. But only hybrids, says Latour, “can change the future” (p. 11). Mainstream 
linguists and mainstream biologists who suffer from the illusions of the Modern 
Constitution practice purification so that nature and society must remain 
absolutely distinct. This includes the first illusion that even though we construct 
nature, nature is as if we did not construct it, and another one, that even though 
we do not construct society, it is as if we construct it (Latour 1993). More 
importantly, Latour shows us that the Modern Constitution entails, besides the 
dichotomy of purification and mediation, the separation between non-humans (as 
nature) and humans (as culture). 
 Hybrids who reject the Modern Constitution, because they practice 
mediation (such as, for instance, anthropologists who study non-Western cultures 
or ethologists who study the physiological and cognitive capacities of different 
species) are seen as outsiders of the purified disciplines of the mainstream. This 
becomes especially apparent when anthropologists study cultures in the West, or 
when ethologists, biologists, linguists, or semioticians study the cognitive 
capacities of humans. 
 Chomsky’s and Sebeok’s grounding in Peircean semeiotic and Uexküllian 
Umwelt theory clearly makes them hybrids (sensu Latour 1993). They have never 
been modern. The difficulty of their position within the field of linguistics (or 
semiotics, even though purification is much less of an issue there) is that their 
work is prone to gross misinterpretation, precisely because the mainstream lives 
by the illusions that uphold the Modern Constitution. As Latour explains, “[the] 
essential point of this Constitution is that it renders the work of mediation that 
assembles hybrids invisible, unthinkable, unrepresentable” (Latour 1993: 34). 
 This can be explained with the predominant folk-definition of Universal 
Grammar, an unfortunate misinterpretation that can be attributed to the artificial 
dichotomies that are the result of the disciplinary purification that wants to see 
the field of linguistics in the social sciences or the humanities (culture) rather 
than — as Chomsky and Sebeok would have it — as a domain of biology, that 
approaches the study of human language as a phenomenon of nature. The folk-
definition of Universal Grammar is something like an equivalent of linguistic 
universals or the things that are shared by all languages, a definition that does 
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not depend on the ethological perspective and is not in contradiction with the 
laws of the Modern Constitution. 
 For most students of linguistics, it is difficult to understand Chomsky’s 
definition of Universal Grammar right away as the properties of the initial state of 
the human faculty of language that are specific to the species. For those who live 
by the Modern Constitution, the hybrid character of this concept remains 
nebulous, “unthinkable, unrepresentable” (Latour 1993), because they want to 
ground everything in the Modern Constitution, keep language in the domain of 
culture, and the field of linguistics separate from biology. For those who 
understand the philosophical background behind the faculty of language as a 
combination of innate capacities, organism-environment interaction (Umwelt), 
and abstract principles that are not specific to the faculty of language (cf. 
Chomsky 2005: 6), the hybrid character of this concept is quite uncontroversial. 
 Modernity has made it impossible for some to take the ethologist’s 
perspective on our species, to mediate instead of separating nature and culture. 
Maybe that fog will begin to lift when recent articulations of posthumanism or 
posthumanities will have penetrated the mainstream and hybrids gain critical 
mass in traditional academic disciplines such as linguistics and biology. 
 Chomsky’s (2009 [1966]) Cartesian Linguistics likewise defies the paradoxes 
of the Modern Constitution, because it begins with the unresolved questions of 
the 17th century. Because the very title of Chomsky’s Chapter in the History of 
Rationalist Thought is perpetually mischaracterized and misinterpreted, especially 
by those who don’t care to read it and prematurely associate its title with a folk 
definition of the Cartesian mind/body dualism, the introduction to the 2009 
edition explains that Descartes “was among the first to recognize the importance 
of this ‘ordinary’ form of linguistic creativity […] for the study of the human 
mind” (p. 1) that is the central focus of biolinguistics. This hybrid concept of 
language as a natural object therefore characterizes biolinguistics as a natural 
science (cf. Boeckx 2005).  
 On the one hand, the cognitive revolution of the mid twentieth century is a 
renewal and further development of the cognitive revolution of the 17th century, 
while another influential factor in the renewal of the cognitive revolution was the 
work of ethologists, a field that defies the principles of the Modern Constitution. 
For the biolinguistic program, Chomsky adapted “[the] framework of ethology 
and comparative psychology […] to the study of human cognitive organs and 
their genetically determined nature, which constructs experience — the organ-
ism’s Umwelt, in ethological terminology — and guides the general path of devel-
opment, just as in all other aspects of growth of organisms” (Chomsky 2006: x). 
 Sebeok’s last articulations of biosemiotics appeared in the year of his pas-
sing in his collection of essays entitled Global Semiotics (Sebeok 2001b). He attri-
butes the origin of biosemiotics, his “principal contribution to general semiotics” 
(p. 180), to his rediscovery of Uexküll’s Umweltlehre, which inspired his definition 
of “[semiosis as] the processual engine which propels organisms to capture ‘ex-
ternal reality’ and thereby come to terms with the cosmos in the shape of species-
specific internal modeling systems” (p. 15). 
 This non-species-specific terminology is the hallmark of Modeling Systems 
Theory, an approach he articulated in The Forms of Meaning together with Marcel 
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Danesi (Sebeok & Danesi 2000), characterizing biosemiotics or global semiotics, 
as a comprehensive life science of nature and culture; or “nature/culture”, as 
Latour (1993) prefers to write. Sebeok, the linguist whose life work was to turn 
semiotics into a science of all life, obviously has never been modern. 
 
 
3. The Search for the Bauplan of Human Language 
 
Since the formation of their professional organizations, the International Society of 
Biosemiotic Studies and the International Network in Biolinguistics have articulated 
their goals and objectives and several publications stand out as foundational. For 
the former society, the core publications are the volumes published in a book 
series on Biosemiotics under the editorship of Marcello Barbieri and Jesper Hoff-
meyer. The third volume in the series, Essential Readings in Biosemiotics, was 
edited by Donald Favareau as a rather copious anthology for a field that is, accor-
ding to the editor, “nothing yet resembling a mature, by which is meant coherent 
[field]” (Favareau 2010: iii). 
 Favareau’s expertise in the historical background as well as current issues 
of biosemiotics is evident in his 80-page introduction that takes the reader through 
“An evolutionary History of Biosemiotics”. From Hellenic thought, through the 
Middle Ages, across Modernity, Favareau narrates the history of concepts in 
biosemiotics based on the following definition: “Biosemiotics is the study of the 
myriad forms of communication and signification observable both within and 
between living systems. It is thus the study of representation, meaning, sense, 
and the biological significance of sign processes — from intercellular signaling 
processes to animal display behavior to human semiotic artifacts such as lang-
uage and abstract symbolic thought” (p. v). 
The book has four parts: “Part 1: Sebeok’s Precursors and Influences” in-
cludes excerpts from Jakob von Uexküll’s (1940) Theory of Meaning, sections from 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1931–1958 [1866–1913]), Charles Morris’s (1955) Signs, 
Language and Behavior, and Yuri Lotman’s (1990) Universe of the Mind. “Part 2: The 
Biosemiotic Project of Thomas A. Sebeok” includes Sebeok’s (2001) own account 
of “Biosemiotics: Its roots and proliferations” and texts by his collaborators Heini 
Hediger (1981) on “The Clever Hans Phenomenon”, Martin Krampen’s (1981) 
“Phytosemiotics”, Thure von Uexküll’s (1993) “Endosemiotics”, Giorgio Prodi’s 
(1988) “Signs and codes in immunology”, Rene Thom’s (1975) chapter “The 
animal mind” from his Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, and Anderson et 
al.’s (1984) “A semiotic perspective on the Sciences: Steps to a new paradigm”. 
“Part 3: Independent Approaches to Biosemiotics” includes Kull’s previously 
unpublished “Theoretical biology on its way to biosemiotics”, Friedrich Roth-
schild’s (1962) “Laws of symbolic mediation”, Marcel Florkin’s (1974) “Concepts 
of molecular biosemiotics and of molecular evolution”, Gregory Bateson’s lecture 
“Form, substance and difference” (included in Bateson 1972), Howard Pattee’s 
(2005) article on “The physics and metaphysics of biosemiotics”, and an excerpt 
from Terrence Deacon’s (1997) The Symbolic Species. Lastly, “Part 4: The Contem-
porary Interdiscipline of Biosemiotics” includes Hoffmeyer & Emmeche’s (1991) 
“Code-Duality and the semiotics of nature” and a chapter from Hoffmeyer’s 
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(2008) book Biosemiotics: An Examination in the Life of Signs and the Signs of Life, an 
article on “Information and semiosis in living systems” by João Queiroz et al. 
(2005), an excerpt from Readers of the Book of Life by philosopher of science Anton 
Markoš (2002), Soren Brier’s (2006) “Cybersemiotic model of communication”, an 
excerpt from philosopher Günther Witzany’s (2007) The Logos of the Bios, and a 
recent article by Marcello Barbieri (2008) on “Biosemiotics: A new understanding 
of life” that was published in Naturwissenschaften, outlining the coexistence of 
code-based bio-semiotics and sign-based (or interpretation-based) biosemiotics. 
While Barbieri’s paper ends by affirming that “all versions of biosemiotics 
share the view that semiosis is fundamental to life” (p. 791), biosemiotics today is 
unequivocally characterized by what Anton Markoš calls a “plurality of view” (p. 
657); and — while Anderson et al. (1981) warned that “optimism for a general or 
unified approach is bound to invite scorn” (p. 404) — many among its practiti-
oners share Jesper Hoffmeyer’s hope for better “transdisciplinary communi-
cation” (p. 590) in the future. 
For biolinguistics, the organization’s website lists Turing’s (1952) paper on 
“The chemical basis of morphogenesis”, D’Arcy Thomson’s (1945) On Growth and 
Form, and Eric Lenneberg’s (1967) Biological Foundations of Language as its foun-
dational texts. More recent articulations include Jenkins’ (2000) Biolinguistics and 
his edited volume Variation and Universals in Biolinguistics (Jenkins 2004), Hauser 
et al.’s (2002) “The language faculty: What is it, who has it, and how did it 
evolve?”, Hauser & Bever’s (2008) “A biolinguistic agenda”, Chomsky’s (2005) 
“Three factors in language design” and his “Biolinguistic Explorations: Design, 
Development, and Evolution” (Chomsky 2007), Di Sciullo’s paper “A biolingu-
istic approach to morphological variation” (2008) from a workshop on Linguistic 
Universals and Linguistic Fieldwork held at Harvard University, and Di Sciullo 
& Boeckx’s (2011) edited volume The Biolinguistic Enterprise: New Perspectives on 
the Evolution and Nature of the Human Language Faculty. 
 Both movements received formative statements outlining fundamental 
questions and issues for the future in 2009. W. Tecumseh Fitch articulated the 
“Prolegomena to a future science of biolinguistics” (Fitch 2009), while biologist/ 
semiotician Kalevi Kull collaborated with biological anthropologist Terrence 
Deacon, molecular biologists Claus Emmeche and Jesper Hoffmeyer, and the 
semiotic theorist Frederik Stjernfelt on the eight surprisingly brief “Theses on bio-
semiotics: Prolegomena to a theoretical biology” (Kull et al. 2009). 
 
1. The semiosic—non-semiosic distinction is coextensive with the life-nonlife 
distinction, i.e. with the domain of general biology. […] 
2. Biology is incomplete as a science in the absence of explicit semiotic 
grounding. […] 
3. The predictive power of biology is embedded in the functional aspect and 
cannot be based on chemistry alone. […] 
4. Differences in methodology distinguish a semiotic biology from non-semiotic 
biology. […] 
5. Function is intrinsically related to organization, signification, and the 
concept of an autonomous agent or self. […] 
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6. The grounding of general semiotics has to use biosemiotic tools. […] 
7. Semiosis is a central concept for biology that requires a more exact 
definition. […] 
8. Organisms create their umwelten. […] 
(Kull et al. 2009: 167–173) 
 
Kull and his colleagues were able to agree on some fundamental ideas on “what 
biology needs to be focused on in order to describe life as a process based on 
semiosis” (Kull et al. 2009: 167). They consider one aim of the movement “to 
explain how life evolves through all varieties of forms of communication and 
signification (including cellular adaptive behavior, animal communication, and 
human intellect) and to provide tools for grounding sign theories” (ibid.). 
 At least the authors of this document seem united in their search for the 
basic concepts for a theoretical biology, although this document excludes the con-
cepts associated with Barbieri’s view that organic semiosis is defined by coding. 
According to Barbieri, coding and interpretation are both present in nature; how-
ever, while organic semiosis gave rise to the organic codes on the cellular level, 
interpretive semiosis, or interpretation, can only exist in organisms that build in-
ternal representations of the world, i.e. in organisms that have a nervous system 
(Barbieri 2011). While the “Theses on Biosemiotics” (Kull et al. 2009) present bio-
semioticians as united in their desire to transform biology away from mechanistic 
paradigms towards sign-based theories, they exclude from their agenda a view 
that sees two distinct semiotic processes on different levels of life (cf. Barbieri 
2011). 
 Fitch’s “Prolegomena to a future science of biolinguistics”, in contrast, 
focuses on the problems that stand in the way of a unified approach to bioling-
uistics. Most may have expected from the prolegomena a unified biolinguistics 
and an inherently diverse biosemiotics, especially because the scope of bioling-
uistics appears to be decidedly narrower (because it is only concerned with the 
human language faculty). Jenkins (2000: 1) highlights the fundamental questions 
of biolinguistics as articulated by Chomsky: 
 
(1) What constitutes knowledge of language? 
(2) How is this knowledge acquired? 
(3) How is this knowledge put to use? 
(4) What are the relevant brain mechanisms? 
(5) How does this knowledge evolve (in the species)? 
 
These are questions that unequivocally interest many biosemioticians, especially 
those practitioners who value the theoretical perspectives provided by Peirce and 
Uexküll. While the overlap in foundational literature seems small at first glance, 
a closer look at Jenkins (2000), Chomsky’s (2005, 2007) own recent articulations 
and the bibliographies of their foundational literature may convince many practi-
tioners of biosemiotics with an interest in human language that they have lived 
with the wrong idea of biolinguistics for too long. Many of them may have been 
guilty of uninformed criticisms of Chomsky, “whose ideas so many scholars 
apparently love to hate” (Fitch 2009: 287). 
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 Fitch gives a sobering assessment of the potential for a biolinguistic science, 
focusing foremost on the sociological, terminological and intellectual impedi-
ments. He criticizes the lack of collaboration between linguistic theory and neuro-
science, and accuses neuroscientists for “a decade or so of somewhat self-
indulgent neo-phrenology” (p. 284). He also sees challenges “concerning termi-
nology, disciplinary turf wars, and struggles for dominance” (p. 285) that may 
exist among biosemioticians as well. 
 Among the real challenges, not sociological but intellectual in nature, Fitch 
points to the theoretical shortcomings in neuroscience and the lack of good colla-
boration with theoretical linguists, because neuroscientists still “do not under-
stand how brains generate minds” and that “principles underlying brain devel-
opment and evolution remain only dimly understood” (Fitch 2009: 285). 
Likewise, neuroscientists do not know how brains generate language, and there 
is very little collaboration between neurolinguists and theoretical linguists (cf. 
Andrews 2011). 
 An important issue for biolinguists, according to Fitch, consists of 
“questions of meaning” and what he calls “unresolved semiotic challenges [that] 
pose problems for any aspect of cognition”. Maybe Fitch and those who agree 
with him would find more satisfying theories of meaning in the foundational 
literature associated with biosemiotics? When Fitch writes “[we] have a good 
theory of information (Shannon information theory), but we lack anything even 
approaching a good theory of meaning” (p. 285), he’s looking for the same 
alternative to “many currently popular models and metaphors for understanding 
genes, brain and language [that] need to be abandoned if [biolinguists] hope to 
make any substantial progress” (p. 286) that many biosemioticians see in main-
stream biology. 
 Most biosemioticians would see eye to eye with Fitch on that central 
challenge. In fact, nobody would agree more with this than Jesper Hoffmeyer, 
who turned to philosophy to address these issues in biology and became 
involved in biosemiotics after connecting with Sebeok in the 1980s. It is precisely 
the vagueness of concepts such as information or signal in biology that drove 
biologists to philosophy and semiotics and fueled the biosemiotic movement. For 
Hoffmeyer, “[biosemiotics] does not turn experimental biology to metaphysics 
but instead replaces an outdated metaphysics — the thought that life is only 
chemistry and molecules — with a far better, more contemporary, and more co-
herent philosophy. Life rather than natural law — and signs rather than atoms — 
must become natural science’s fundamental phenomena” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 15). 
 While Barbieri has reached out to biolinguists to explore common interests 
and possibilities of collaboration (Barbieri 2010, 2011), Hoffmeyer has relied on 
popular misconceptions about Chomsky’s biolinguistics that lead him, for 
instance, to reject Chomsky and prefer Bruner (1985) on the issue of language 
development. (cf. Hoffmeyer 2008) As one of the biosemiotic movement’s most 
prolific and formidable articulators, it is unfortunate that he has turned his back 
on an intellectual movement that shares so many foundational philosophical 
parallels, and whose progress depends on much of the same issues and 
challenges as his own efforts in biology and biosemiotics. 
 What distinguishes Bruner from Chomsky is the fact that Bruner conducted 
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empirical research on mother-infant communication to gain a better under-
standing of language acquisition, while Chomsky has maintained consistently 
that three factors constitute the human faculty of language: (1) the genetic 
endowment, (2) organism–environment interaction (species-specific Umwelt), and 
(3) abstract principles not specific to the faculty of language (cf. Chomsky 2005, 
2007). To say Bruner has the better theory of language development, because he 
chose to study mothers and infants in their homes is like accusing Chomsky for 
not focusing on what he chose not to focus on. 
 Moreover, while the empirical studies of mother-infant interaction make a 
worth-while research agenda, it is one that supports the Modern Constitution 
(sensu Latour 1993) in the sense that the homes of families in the New York area 
in the 1980s are bound to have outcomes that are culture-specific and relevant 
only for urban middle-class families in the West; while the abstract principles of 
human language the way they have been studied by biolinguists are not subject 
to this kind of cultural bias, because they belong to a research agenda that is built 
on a Galilean-style theory construction (cf. Boeckx 2005) that remains on the 
ethological level and defies the distinction between nature and culture, and in the 
sense of Latour (1993) has never been modern. To refuse to engage with what 
Chomsky has focused on, because of what he has chosen not to focus on (even 
though he never disputed its relevance to other research agendas) is like criticiz-
ing a pianist for never playing the violin. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Biolinguists may find ideas for addressing the ‘semiotic challenge’ (Fitch 2009) in 
the foundational texts for biosemiotics (e.g., Favareau 2010). Likewise, biosemio-
ticians who are interested in human language simply cannot afford to bypass 
biolinguistics. Some foundational insights in linguistics have merit on that level 
of analysis that is the ethological/comparative psychological perspective, even 
though they may not tap into many physiological, affective, or social aspects 
associated with human language. 
 Linguists in the context of semiotic Gatherings therefore always run the risk 
of being perceived as naive or uninformed about the many layers of language 
and communication the abstractions of mainstream linguistics do not address. 
But good pianists can appreciate the violin even if they choose not to play it 
themselves. 
 Semioticians in the context of linguistics, likewise, have the challenges any 
hybrid faces in the ‘mainstream’; but biosemioticians who are interested in finding 
the Bauplan for human language, should find capable collaborators among 
biolinguists. In both fields, there are likely to be “linguists and biologists, along 
with researchers in the relevant branches of psychology and anthropology, [who] 
can move beyond unproductive theoretical debate to a more collaborative, 
empirically focused and comparative research program aimed at uncovering 
both shared (homologous or analogous) and unique components of the faculty of 
language” (Hauser et al. 2002: 298). 
 In the spirit of such a collaborative, empirically focused and comparative 
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research program, Fitch (2009: 311) sees the future of biolinguistics in formulating 
testable hypotheses on the biology of language such as the following example 
concerning language acquisition: 
 
If human language acquisition is just a special case of a general innate 
capacity for acquiring culture (Tomasello 1999), then individual progress in 
acquiring language should be closely correlated, both temporally and across 
individuals, with their progress in other aspects of socialization and mastery 
of non-linguistic culture (cf. Markson & Bloom 1997). 
 
 Some skeptics may question whether that is, indeed, a good hypothesis; 
and others may argue over the best way to empirically test it. It may seem 
unsatisfying or uninspiring to see the big questions about language reformulated 
as hypotheses such as this one; and, more importantly, they can only be pursued 
within the institutional structures that allow linguists and psychologists to write 
grant proposals that are considered ‘worthy’ within the mainstream that will 
likely perpetuate the Modern Constitution (Latour 1993) for some time. 
 It will be difficult for the hybrids to establish new paths of collaboration that 
allow them to truly transcend the practices of purification that keep the 
disciplinary boundaries intact. In his Biolinguistics, Jenkins (2000: 18) quotes 
Medawar & Medawar’s (1978: 166) anecdote of Keats denouncing Newton “for 
destroying all the beauty of the rainbow by reducing it to the prismatic colours”. 
He proceeds by quoting Francois Jacob’s famous explanation for why the 
outcomes of smaller questions are more promising than insisting on the big 
questions that has become the mantra of biolinguistics. Jacob explained that  
[science] proceeds differently. It operates by detailed experimentation with 
nature and thus appears less ambitious, at least at first glance. It does not 
aim at reaching at once a complete and definitive explanation of the whole 
universe, its beginning, and its present form. Instead, it looks for partial and 
provisional answers about those phenomena that can be isolated and well 
defined. Actually, the beginning of modern science can be dated from the 
time when such general questions as “How was the universe created? What 
is matter made of? What is the essence of life?” were replaced by such 
limited questions as “How does a stone fall? How does water flow in a tube? 
How does blood circulate in vessels?” This substitution had an amazing 
result. While asking general questions led to limited answers, asking limited 
questions turned out to provide more and more general answers. 
(Jacob 1977: 1161–1162)  
 While the big questions are what has brought researchers in so many 
different fields together in biosemiotics, decomposing their common interests 
into smaller explanatory hypotheses will be much more difficult for them to 
achieve. Jacob’s mantra works for biolinguists; and they have a much better 
chance at progressing along their chosen path to gain a better understanding of 
the faculty of language. But the “semiotic challenge” (Fitch 2009) remains for 
biolinguistics; and it remains to be seen if future cross-disciplinary collaboration 
will bring forth any hybrids who “can change the future” (Latour 1993: 11). 
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